I. Introduction
Since 2009, the unemployment rate in the United States has remained above eight percent, which means that more than twelve million individuals have been looking for work at any given time. With so many affected individuals, unemployment has become an issue of public concern, particularly as stories describing employers refusing to consider currently unemployed candidates for job opportunities have proliferated. In response to these trends, about twenty states and the federal government have passed, or are considering, legislation designed to prohibit employers from discriminating against individuals based on their employment status.
Although several bills already have been enacted to date, nearly all of the articles on this subject have been authored by members of various law firms' employment practices. 1 These articles primarily focus on the legislative activity, discussing what employers need to know to anticipate and avoid liability. The one scholarly article that deals with this issue takes the mirror-image approach in that it primarily echoes the policy positions of employee-rights advocates and does not examine the specifics of any of the proposed or enacted bills. 2 The goal of this Article is to survey the legislative activity, identify the factors driving it, and analyze its potential ramifications. I contend that it is unreasonable to project that this legislation will significantly reduce unemployment because there is only anecdotal data regarding the prevalence of discrimination against unemployed candidates in hiring and, regardless of the frequency of such a practice, none of the proposed or enacted legislation directly promotes job creation. However, I argue that the anti-unemployment discrimination legislation is a positive example of interest convergence in that it benefits the economy by reducing arbitrary discrimination in hiring and long-term unemployment. Furthermore, such legislation expresses a set of positive societal values and protects members of constitutionally-protected groups who are likely disproportionately impacted by current-employment requirements. I then discuss why the concerns advanced by the business community are overstated given the generally limited scope of the legislation, the lack of a private right of action, and the legally-approved uses of employment status as a proxy for characteristics about which a business might reasonably care. In sum, when taking an objective look, the anti-unemployment discrimination legislation is neither panacea, placebo, nor poison.
II. Background

A. Unemployment in the U.S.
In January 2013, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that more than twelve million Americans, or about eight percent of the civilian labor force, were unemployed. 3 Approximately five million of these individuals had been out of work for more than twenty-seven weeks. 4 In terms of distribution, the unemployment rate for whites was 7 percent, while the rates for blacks and Hispanics were 13.8 and 9.7 percent, respectively. 5 The unemployment rates for adult men and for adult women were both 7.3 percent. 6 The unemployment rate for the disabled was 13.7 percent against 8.3 percent for individuals without any disabilities. 7 On the whole, unemployment rates for older individuals was slightly lower than the rates for their younger cohorts but a much larger percentage of older unemployed individuals are longterm unemployed. 8 Political polls reflect these numbers with unemployment dominating as an area of concern. In September 2012, seventytwo percent of respondents in a national Gallup poll stated that economic problems are the most important problem facing the country today. 9 Thirty-two percent of the total respondents specifically identified "unemployment/jobs." 10 In a related Gallup poll, more than three-quarters of respondents said that it is a bad time to find a quality job. 11 
B. Rising Perception that Prospective Employers Discriminate Against Unemployed Candidates
In late May 2010, a staffing agency advertised a position with Sony Ericsson in Atlanta that stated, "Candidates MUST be currently working for an original consumer electronics manufacturer in marketing. NO EXCEPTIONS." 13 Shortly thereafter, the advertisement came to the attention of the Orlando Sentinel, which ran an article questioning the employer's practice of excluding candidates based on their employment status. 14 A spokesperson for Sony Ericsson quickly explained that there had been a miscommunication with the recruiter and that the language in the advertisement was a mistake. 15 A handful of articles discussing this practice quickly followed, although actual data remained anecdotal. 16 For example, a New York Post columnist detailed the story of Andrea Altieri, an individual with years of work experience and a master's degree, who was shocked to encounter a job posting in her area that required proof of "current W-2 income." 17 The piece further observed that a search through a job-listing aggregator website showed that a number of job advertisements in the New York City area required applicants to be currently working for positions, such as sales http://www.gallup.com/poll/155375/Jobs-Glaring-Issue-GroupsOthers.aspx representative and bank office manager. 18 Several job recruiters commented on the prevalence of this practice and bias. 19 Despite the instances of discrimination against the unemployed being only anecdotal, the reaction to the news has been strong. For example, an article on the topic published on the Huffington Post received over 3,000 comments. 20 Furthermore, an October 2010 article in the Atlanta JournalConstitution focused on people's sense of outrage at the practice. 21 A common refrain was that it should be illegal. 22 In June 2011, in a national survey conducted by Hart Research Associates, eighty percent of respondents described the refusal to consider unemployed job applicants as "very unfair." 23 Almost two-thirds of respondents said they favored a congressional proposal to make "it illegal for companies to refuse to hire or consider a qualified job applicant solely because the person is currently unemployed." 24 With this backdrop, and as a presidential election approached, 25 State and local legislators have been quick to propose legislation to address the perceived problem of employers discriminating against unemployed candidates in hiring. New Jersey and Oregon passed bills that regulate job advertisements. The District of Columbia passed a broader bill that also prohibits employers from using employment status as a basis for hiring decisions. More than a dozen other states have considered or are considering legislation. The trend appears to show that expansive bills face a more difficult path than narrower ones.
a. New Jersey
On March 29, 2010, New Jersey passed a statute aimed at stopping employers from discriminating against the unemployed, enacting the legislation within six months of the bill's introduction in the state assembly. 27 The legislative process illustrates some of the competing considerations at play, including Governor Chris Christie voicing concerns about excess regulation and the legislature seeking to protect the unemployed.
On October 7, 2010, Democrat Assemblyman Peter Barnes proposed a bill that would prohibit an employer or its agent from publishing job vacancies that prohibit or suggest that unemployed individuals should not apply for the advertised positions. 28 Eleven days later, the state assembly passed the proposed bill by a 58-to-18 margin with two abstentions. 29 3. This act shall take effect immediately. 31 On January 6, 2011, Governor Christie returned the bill with several recommendations. 32 Specifically, Christie voiced his concerns that the bill would harm the state's business community by subjecting it to "significant fines, penalties and unwarranted litigation without requiring a finding of knowing and purposeful conduct on the part of the employer." 33 He further asserted that the term "suggesting" was too vague to provide employers with proper notice. 34 Christie also argued that the penalties were too strong and that the bill was unclear as to whether a private civil cause of action had been created. 35 Finally, Christie noted that the "bill's provisions likely conflict with existing civil service laws, rules and regulations and may subject appointing authorities to the penalties set forth in the legislation." 36 In less than two months, the New Jersey state legislature addressed Christie's concerns and passed the final bill, which provides: In addition, nothing set forth in this section shall be construed as prohibiting an employer or employer's agent, representative, or designee from publishing, in print or on the Internet, an advertisement for any job vacancy that contains any provision stating that only applicants who are currently employed by such employer will be considered. 37 The legislation included maximum civil penalties of $1,000 for the first violation, $5,000 for the second violation, and $10,000 for each subsequent violation. 38 The legislation explicitly disclaims that it creates a private right of action. 39 Ultimately, the final version of the legislation appears to have followed a middle path. The law prohibits employers from posting job advertisements that exclude currently unemployed candidates. 40 However, it does not ban consideration of either past or present employment statuses in hiring decisions. 41 Also, it subjects violators to civil fines. 42 These fines are graduated penalties, with the severity rising with recidivism. 43 employed. 46 The law further protects whistleblowers, prohibiting employers from restraining current employees' exercise of rights conferred by the act or from retaliating against employees who take action under the act. 47 Despite implementing broad protections for the unemployed, the law permits employers to (1) post job advertisements that require occupational or professional licenses or other similar qualifications, (2) consider the reasons underlying a candidate's unemployment, and (3) publish job advertisements that state only the employer's current employees will be considered. 48 No private right of action is created. 49 Instead, aggrieved individuals must file claims with the District of Columbia's Office of Human Rights, which must investigate all claims and assess civil penalties against employers determined to have violated the act. 50 The civil fines are as follows: $1,000 per claimant for an initial violation, $5,000 per claimant for a second violation, and $10,000 per claimant for each subsequent violation, not to exceed a total of $20,000 per violation. 51 Currently, the District of Columbia stands alone in prohibiting employers from considering a candidate's employment status in the ultimate hiring decision. However, as noted below, the federal proposals are very similar.
c. Oregon
On March 27, 2012, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber signed into law an act that prohibits discrimination against the unemployed in job listings. 52 The Oregon law was passed within two months of its introduction in the state senate. 53 The California legislature passed Assembly Bill 1450 on August 30, 2012, enrolling the bill for Governor Jerry Brown's approval on September 11, 2012. 58 The version of the bill that passed both the state assembly and senate hews closely to the model of New Jersey and Oregon. 59 The California legislation, however, has a few unique aspects to it. First, in addition to applying to employers and employment agencies, it also prohibits operators of internet web sites from publishing advertisements that exclude currently unemployed candidates, unless such advertisement is based on a bona fide occupational qualification or are restricted to current employees of the employer. 60 Second, state contractors who violate the statute may have their contracts cancelled and may be barred from seeking other state contracts for up to three years. 61 The most interesting thing about the California legislation is that its scope was much broader when it was originally introduced in January 2012. First, it defined "status as unemployed" as including an individual's past unemployment. 62 Second, in addition to the publication provisions that ultimately passed, the proposed legislation would have prohibited employers from refusing to consider candidates based on their status as unemployed and it would have made it unlawful for employment agencies to refuse to refer somebody on the same basis. 63 Third, the proposed legislation included whistleblower protections. 64 The California Senate cut these provisions through its amendments. 65 The bill was then passed after its third reading. 66 However, on September 30, 2012, Governor Brown returned the bill without his signature, stating without explanation that the changes could lead to unnecessary confusion. 67
e. Pending State Legislation
In Arizona, House Bill 2660 was introduced on January 25, 2012 but it has been held in committees since then. 68 The proposed bill would treat long-term unemployment status (defined as twenty-seven or more continuous weeks of unemployment) like race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, or disability, prohibiting employers and employment agencies from using long-term unemployment status as a basis for hiring and other employment decisions. 69 analogous proposal failed in the Wisconsin Senate. 72 In Connecticut, the general assembly introduced Bill No. 5199, which would prohibit employers both from posting job advertisements that excluded unemployed candidates and from refusing to hire an individual based on their current and recent employment status, unless it was a bona fide occupational qualification. 73 The bill appears to have failed. 74 Similar proposals in New York and Pennsylvania are still pending while proposed bills in Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota, and Tennessee have been stalled or killed in committees. 75 In New Hampshire, House Bill 350 was introduced on January 3, 2013 and is now in committee. 76 would prohibit employers and employment agencies from discriminating against unemployed individuals in hiring decisions and advertisements. 77 Violations would result in a fine of no more than $5,000 for the first violation and $10,000 for subsequent violations. 78 However, unlike Connecticut's proposed bill described in the paragraph above, New Hampshire's proposed bill does not include an explicit exception for bona fide occupational qualifications. 79 In Colorado, House Bill 12-1134 was introduced on January 20, 2012. 80 In substance, it is very similar to the legislation passed by New Jersey, calling for the same penalties, substantive scope, and absence of a private right of action. 81 In response to the early news stories of employers discriminating against unemployed candidates, in November 2010, more than fifty members of Congress wrote to the chairperson of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), voicing their outrage and calling on the agency to investigate how the practice of excluding unemployed individuals from consideration for job opportunities might have an adverse impact on minority groups. 87 The members of Congress further asserted that if employers discriminated against the unemployed, it would prolong the unemployment crisis. 88 On February 16, 2011, the EEOC met to examine the treatment of unemployed job seekers. 89 The EEOC heard from eight panelists who came from the U.S. Department of Labor, 84. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2- 160-055 (2012 106 These proposals are very similar to the American Jobs Act provisions described above. The key difference is that H.R. 2501 and S. 1471 prohibit employers from discriminating against candidates based on the candidate's history of unemployment as well as the candidate's current employment status. 107 The bills remain in committee. 108 III. Discussion
A. Solutions in Search of a Problem?
One of the most curious aspects of the flurry of legislative activity detailed above is that it appears to be based on very little evidence that discrimination against the unemployed is actually a widespread practice. A dozen or so articles detailed a handful of cases and included reports of recruiters acknowledging the existence of the practice even when not explicitly stated. 109 And, as seen in the legislative records, these stories generally have formed the basis for the proposed legislation. 110 But only one survey has been conducted and publicized. In 2011, the National Employment Law Project (NELP) found more than 150 job postings on employment web sites such as Indeed.com, CareerBuilder.com, and Monster.com requiring that applicants "must be currently employed" or using other exclusionary language based on current employment status. 111 Michael Saltsman, a research fellow at the Employment Policies Institute, took issue with the NELP report. 112 Saltsman observed that one of the websites examined by NELP estimated that there were three million job posts available online when NELP searched its site. 113 unemployed was less than 0.005% of one month's job postings. 114 Saltsman further contended that the NELP report took words out of context, citing an example in which the phrase "currently employed" appeared but did not indicate that the unemployed were unwelcome to apply. 115 Saltsman concluded that, given the lack of hard data as to whether employers are discriminating against the unemployed, the legislative activity is misguided, as it would create a new liability for employers while doing little to lower the unemployment rate. 116 It is also possible that employers are reducing their use of employment status in hiring given the public's response to the practice. For example, as noted above, Sony Erickson-whose 2010 advertisement kicked off the public debate-quickly disclaimed any responsibility for the inclusion of the currentemployment requirement in the posting. 117 Additionally, in September 2011, the job listing website Indeed.com said that it would stop posting advertisements that exclude applications from unemployed candidates. 118 Accordingly, there are several data points that suggest employers might be moving away from excluding unemployed candidates even absent legislation.
As exemplified by the testimony of the various panelists at the EEOC hearing to examine the practice of excluding currently unemployed people from an applicant pool, there are other general trends and perspectives that might color whether one believes that unemployment discrimination is widespread. At the EEOC hearing, William E. Spriggs, Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of Labor, was the first to testify. 119 He noted that there were approximately nine unemployed job seekers for every two available positions and that, given the surplus in labor supply, "employers, of course, are going to very likely up the ante on job applicants." 120 He specifically referenced the possibility that employers might require applicants to be currently employed or only very recently unemployed and observed that it is hard to quantify the prevalence of the practice because it might not be done openly. 121 Christine Owens, Executive Director of the National Employment Law Project (NELP), echoed these views, describing anecdotal reports of the discriminatory practices and the disparate impact it has had on older workers, women, and minorities. 122 On the other hand, Fernan R. Cepero, Vice President for Human Resources of The YMCA of Greater Rochester, representing the Society for Human Resource Management, discussed the costs involved in hiring, explaining that the key issue for employers is getting the right employee as opposed to privileging an artificial marker such as current employment status. 123 He further stated that his organization is unaware of any trend in excluding the unemployed from consideration for jobs. 124 James S. Urban, a partner at Jones Day, seconded Cepero's remarks and described looking through "help wanted" sections of major newspapers and not turning up any advertisements that excluded the unemployed. 125 Although there is a paucity of data supporting the notion that discrimination against the unemployed is a widespread practice, as discussed further below, the legislative activity might have some beneficial economic effects and expresses social values. The legislative activity will likely aid members of constitutionally-protected classes who are unemployed and disproportionately impacted by the practice, and will not result in the parade of horribles described by employer-friendly industry groups. 
B. Anti-Unemployment Discrimination Legislation as a Means of Reducing Unemployment or Otherwise Improving the Economy
The public rhetoric in support of the anti-unemployment discrimination legislation often includes strong words about how discrimination against the unemployed prolongs joblessness and hurts the economy. For example, at a press conference promoting the proposed Fair Employment Opportunity Act in September 2011, Senator Sherrod Brown said: "The best way to get our economy back on track is also the best way to reduce our deficit: putting people back to work. There are millions of Americans who would rather be paying taxes than collecting unemployment insurance." 126 In an article attacking opponents of New Jersey's anti-unemployment discrimination legislation, a New Jersey assemblyman stated: "It is also now apparent that when our state's Republican leaders talk about creating jobs for New Jersey residents, those jobs aren't necessarily for the jobless." 127 A state senator, supporting the passage of the Oregon bill, asserted: "It's crazy to say that you have to have work, to look for work. If you had work, you wouldn't need work, so you wouldn't have to look for work. We're just trying to make it clear that people who don't have work can look for work." 128 While this rhetoric speaks to a sense of injustice and lack of fairness, it does not actually explain the mechanics of how the bills might reduce unemployment. Illustrating this gap, the California Assembly's Committee on Judiciary issued a report in which it asked whether employers' policies discriminating 126. Press Release, Sherrod Brown, Senator for Ohio, Unemployed Ohioans Need Not Apply: Brown Calls for Swift Passage of Bill Outlawing Discrimination Against Jobless Americans (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/brown-joinsunemployed-worker-in-columbus-to-call-for-swift-passage-of-bill-outlawingdiscrimination-against-the-unemployed.
127 against the unemployed exacerbate the unemployment crisis. 129 The supporters of the bill argued that such policies "reflect insensitivity to today's sever job deficit" and that "the lack of available job openings and the denial of employment opportunities that do exist create stark obstacles for more than 14 million unemployed who simply want to get back to work." 130 The problem with this statement is that addressing putative barriers for unemployed candidates does not clearly mitigate the issue of overwhelming job scarcity, which presumably drives the high unemployment rates and the negative economic effects of high unemployment.
To this point, writing in opposition to California's antiunemployment discrimination bill, a coalition of employer groups lead by the California Chamber of Commerce explained, "Finally, this bill will not affect the unemployment rate. If there is an available position, the employer will ultimately hire someone." 131 Additionally, as an Oregon representative observed, "There's nothing I can perceive in this piece of legislation that would create one more job in the private sector." 132 As the opponents of the anti-unemployment discrimination bills argue, the salutary effect of the bills probably will not be a reduction in aggregate unemployment. Even if we assume that most employers have a preference for hiring currently employed individuals, in the aggregate, employer-demand for a new full-time employee presumably ultimately results in the hiring of a currently unemployed individual. When an employer excludes the currently unemployed from its applicant pool, it does so in the belief that it can entice a currently employed individual to leave his or her job for the new position. If this belief is correct, the new hire's old position presumably is now open and must be filled. Eventually, some employer will have to either opt to let its position remain vacant and suffer the associated economic costs or hire a currently unemployed individual. In other words, it is job creation that reduces unemployment and the anti-unemployment discrimination bills do not obviously encourage job creation. 133 To the contrary, it is possible that some employers might actually forgo seeking to fill positions based on liability concerns related to the antiunemployment discrimination legislation. 134 On the other hand, the anti-unemployment discrimination legislation probably has economic benefits other than reducing unemployment in the aggregate. First, it is widely acknowledged that arbitrary discrimination negatively impacts the economy. As a senator stated when discussing Title VII, "There is considerable evidence to demonstrate that permitting people to be hired on the basis of their qualifications not only helps business, but also improves the total national economy." 135 Amongst other harms, discriminatory exclusions in hiring can alienate clients and artificially limit applicant pools. 136 Second, although the anti-unemployment discrimination legislation is unlikely to reduce the aggregate amount of unemployment, it might lead to an economically healthier distribution and pattern of unemployment. By reducing barriers for unemployed candidates, the anti-unemployment suffer too, leading to fewer motivated job seekers and a rise in health and emotional problems. 143 Although long-term unemployment is not singled out as the target of the legislation, these sentiments have been captured in the legislative records of several proposed antiunemployment discrimination bills. 144 For example, the most recently introduced federal bill states that discrimination against the unemployed burdens commerce by:
( 1) reducing personal consumption and undermining economic stability and growth; (2) squandering human capital essential to the Nation's economic vibrancy and growth; (3) increasing demands for Federal and State unemployment insurance benefits, reducing trust fund assets, and leading to higher payroll taxes for employers, cuts in benefits for jobless workers, or both; (4) imposing additional burdens on publicly funded health and welfare programs; and (5) depressing income, property, and other tax revenues that the Federal Government, States, and localities rely on to support operations and institutions essential to commerce. 145 Despite the general thrust of public rhetoric in support of the anti-unemployment discrimination bill, they are unlikely to reduce unemployment in the aggregate but they might change the demographics of the unemployed in a manner that benefits the economy. Laws communicate a society's values. 146 People may support a law because they "believe that [the law] is intrinsically valuable for the relevant 'statement' to be made" and not because of the law's ability to control behavior." 147 Given the unclear economic benefit of anti-unemployment discrimination bills, it is easiest to characterize them as expressions of social values.
C. Anti-Unemployment Discrimination Bills as an Expression of Social Values
First, the bills express society's understanding of fairness. As noted above, in June 2011, in a national survey conducted by Hart Research Associates, eighty percent of respondents described employers' refusal to consider unemployed job applicants as "very unfair." 148 Indeed, the public rhetoric surrounding the bills mirrors this. For example, Senator Brown promoted the proposed Fair Employment Opportunity Act of 2012 by stating, "Americans who work hard and play by the rules-but lose a job through no fault of their own-deserve a fair chance at the next one." 149 And, as Helen Norton, a professor at the University of Colorado Law School, testified before the EEOC, current employment is likely a weak proxy for former professional success or relevant experience. 150 Second, the bills express a sense of care for the sensibilities of the unemployed. For example, following the initial passage of the New Jersey bill in the state assembly, Democrat Assemblyman Paul Moriarty wrote a piece that unfavorably compared Assemblyman Jay Webber, one of New Jersey's highest-ranking Republicans, unfavorably to "heartless elitists" after Webber voted against the bill. 151 Moriarty explained that employers who run job advertisements that exclude unemployed candidates "make unemployed people feel like 146. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 REV. , 2022 REV. (1996 lepers, outcasts and losers." 152 and communicated that, "You're damaged goods, you don't merit consideration, jobs are not for the jobless, just for those already employed!" 153 He argued that preventing this message was more important than protecting businesses from additional regulation.
D. Anti-Unemployment Discrimination Bills as Protection for Members of Constitutionally-Protected Classes
Employment status, in and of itself, is not immutable and, therefore, does not fit comfortably within the set of existing constitutionally-protected classes. 154 This might explain why the legislative attempts to turn employment status into a protected class have been less successful than enacting narrower anti-unemployment discrimination bills. 155 But the concern that discrimination against unemployed candidates might disproportionately impact minorities, seniors, women, and the disabled appears to have driven the initial federal activity. For example, the November 2010 letter from more than fifty member of Congress to the chairperson of the EEOC explicitly identified the worry that excluding unemployed individuals from consideration for job opportunities might have an adverse impact on minority groups. 156 Risks and Costs, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 271, 320 (2010) ("A key difference between antidiscrimination laws and common law doctrine is that the former creates protected classes defined primarily (although not exclusively-religion is an exception) on immutable traits of the employee, like race, age, and genetics, while common law doctrine focuses on the employer's reasons or the employee's actions, without regard to such inherent traits."). focused on this issue. 157 At the EEOC hearing, Assistant Secretary Spriggs observed that African Americans, Latinos, and workers with disabilities were overrepresented in the unemployment pool. 158 He further explained that older workers make up a disproportionate share of the long-term unemployed. 159 He concluded "there is the strong indication that there's the potential for disparate impacts among racial minorities, among workers with disabilities, and among older workers." 160 Christine Owens, Executive Director of NELP, also described anecdotal reports of the discriminatory practices and the disparate impact they likely have had on older workers, women, and minorities. 161 Fatima Goss Graves, Vice President for Education and Employment at the National Women's Law Center, testified that the practice would likely have a disparate impact on women, noting that women have lost ground to men in employment rates during the recession and that women are more likely to be long-term unemployed. 162 Algernon Austin, Director of the Race, Ethnicity, and the Economy Program at the Economic Policy Institute, asserted that the practice would have a disparate impact on racial minorities, focusing on their current and historical high rates of unemployment, when compared to whites. 163 Joyce Bender, CEO of Bender Consulting Services, likewise discussed why the practice would have a disparate impact on the disabled, explaining that many individuals become disabled after an accident that leaves them without a current job. 164 The testimony of Assistant Secretary Spriggs, and the rest of the speakers, is consistent with the data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, which is described above.
On the other hand, Mr. Urban, a partner at Jones Day, Regardless as to whether Mr. Urban or Professor Norton is right about whether a member of a racial minority group could demonstrate that a particular practice has a legally cognizable disparate impact, the anti-unemployment discrimination bills have value precisely because a Title VII challenge to a currentemployment requirement would be difficult. More generally, the anti-unemployment discrimination bills arguably are necessary preventative measures to cover gaps or weak spots in existing anti-discrimination statutes.
The prophylactic value of the bills is even more pronounced when considering the effect of a current-employment requirement on older individuals. Actions, otherwise prohibited by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 168 ("ADEA"), are not unlawful if the differentiation made by the employer "is based on reasonable factors other than age." 169 This is a defense unique to the ADEA, making liability under an ADEA adverse impact theory narrower than under Title VII, and mixed-motives are permissible in the ADEA context. 170 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2009);  effect, the broader anti-unemployment discrimination bills (such as that passed by the District of Columbia) remove employment status from the set of reasonable factors that would otherwise permit an employer to differentiate between younger and older candidates. (Whether employment status ever is a bona fide qualification or a proxy for legitimate qualifications is discussed further in the next section.)
E. Business Community's Concerns About Legislation Are Likely Overstated
In opposition to the anti-unemployment discrimination bills, the business community has marshaled several arguments, which focus on the potential harms. In particular, pro-employer commentators have questioned whether the bills will (1) open the floodgate of potentially frivolous litigation and (2) reduce employers' ability to properly vet applicants. 171 These concerns appear overstated given the generally limited scope of the legislation, the lack of a private right of action, and legally approved uses of employment status and history.
Concern that Legislation Will Open Floodgate of Litigation
The pro-employer faction, typified by the large law firms that do labor law defense work, has suggested whether the anti-unemployment discrimination bills will lead to a significant increase in litigation. For example, an associate at Proskauer Rose contends that the definition of unemployment status in some proposals is so broad that it could apply to just about any query regarding the candidate's work history. 172 He also notes that some of the proposals allow for a private right of action with regard to the restrictions on including exclusionary language in job advertisements. 173 He argues that, under these proposals, it is possible for any currently unemployed individual to identify a non-complying job posting, inquire about the position, and, if refused employment, file a lawsuit. 174 He further asserts that such proposals unduly encourage litigation. 175 He also raises the specter of negligent-hiring claims, reasoning that, for fear of liability and costs, human resources personnel might not as vigorously question a candidate's past work experience or follow-up on the contents of a resume's work history and this might lead to employers hiring poor applicants. 176 The floodgate concern appears overstated. First, the District of Columbia appears to be the exception that proves the rule in terms of the scope of the anti-unemployment discrimination legislation. Besides the District of Columbia, the states that have enacted anti-unemployment discrimination legislation have all restricted the statutes to regulating job advertisements. 177 And, as is illustrated by the discussion of California's legislative history in particular and the current status of the pending bills in general, it is unlikely that the broader bills will pass. 178 Second, the passed statutes prohibit a practice that could serve as a predicate for a Title VII disparate impact claim. 179 The easy-to-follow bright line rule might actually reduce litigation given that an employer that uses candidates' employment status in hiring decisions might violate existing federal law if it has the effect of discriminating against a constitutionally-protected class under a disparate impact theory. With that said, even if an employer complies with the job advertisement restrictions of the New Jersey and Oregon Third, state legislatures and agencies have examined the problem and their findings generally do not suggest that the anti-unemployment discrimination legislation would lead to a significant increase in litigation. For example, the California Assembly Committee on Appropriations estimated that there might be several thousand cases a year but, for fiscal purposes, the California Senate Appropriations Committee suggested that only about 250 cases would be filed for investigation and determination by the administrative agency tasked with handling employment discrimination claims. 181 The District of Columbia estimated that there would be about 150 new cases a year. 182 Fourth, the majority of bills-and all three of the enacted statutes-do not permit a private right of action. 183 Thus, focusing on the potential for spurious suits by individuals is an attack against a straw man.
Fifth, as discussed below, employers may still take into account employment status where it is appropriate or necessary as a bona fide qualification. 184 Companies, therefore, should not be constrained from making diligent inquiries into their candidates' histories. And this implies that there should be little additional negligent-hiring liability exposure.
Concern that Legislation Will Prevent Proper Vetting of Candidates
The pro-employer faction also has argued that the antiunemployment discrimination laws will alter how employers approach the hiring process, limiting what employers will ask about candidates' work histories. 185 For example, in its opposition to the California bill, the California Chamber of Commerce explained that the bill would place employers in the impossible situation of either: (1) investigating an applicant's most recent employment, including the reasons for the separation of his/her employment with the employer and potentially face an administrative claim or litigation for the alleged violation of AB 1450 if the applicant is ultimately not hired; or (2) forego any investigation into the most recent employment of the applicant to prevent a claim that he/she was discriminated against on the basis of the applicant's "unemployed status," and risk a potential negligent hiring claim on the backend for hiring an at-risk employee that the employer knew or should have known was a potential danger. 186 Likewise, Proskauer Rose has asserted that employers might raise suspicions by concentrating on gaps in a candidate's work history and, therefore, "commonplace interview or application questions concerning unaccounted-for time on a resume may become scarce. These arguments do not apply to the New Jersey and Oregon legislation because these statutes do not prohibit an employer from using employment history as part of the hiring criteria. 188 But even as to the District of Columbia antiunemployment discrimination law, the strength of these arguments is questionable because it explicitly permits an employer to examine the reasons underlying an individual's status as unemployed in assessing an individual's ability to perform a job or in otherwise making employment decisions about that individual. 189 The bona fide occupational qualification exception is well established, as it also appears in the Title VII and ADEA statutes. 190 Furthermore, it is not obvious that there is a strong link between an individual's employment status and his or her abilities. At the EEOC hearing, Professor Norton explained that current employment status probably is a poor proxy for quality job performance given that one might be unemployed for reasons unrelated to one's skills. 191 Specifically, Professor Norton notes that one might have been in school or a training program, had to leave a job because of spousal relocation, lost a job because of lack of seniority during employer downsizing or because the employer eliminated an entire division or shut down altogether, or left employment temporarily due to illness, injury, disability, pregnancy, or family care-giving responsibilities. 192 Professor Norton also stated that current employment is a poor proxy for relevant experience because the candidate might have been unemployed because he or she has been in school receiving training. 193 Putting aside the efficacy issues of using employment status in hiring decisions, courts do have some experience grappling with the use of unemployment status as a proxy for characteristics that are not constitutionally-protected in the context of Batson challenges. Some courts have focused on the link between unemployment status and susceptibility to other forms of discrimination. 194 But other courts have approached the use of an individual's lack of current employment as being a legitimate proxy for analytic ability, responsibility, and having ties to the community. 195 Accordingly, to the extent that a candidate's employment history raised questions about these factors, it is likely that a potential employer would be able to ask about the candidate's employment history without fear of liability under the anti-unemployment discrimination statutes.
F. The Rise of Anti-Unemployment Discrimination Legislation and Interest Convergence
The anti-unemployment discrimination bills appear to be part of a trend of legislation and regulation that prohibits employers from using criteria that disproportionately impact vulnerable individuals without being clearly tied to legitimate qualifications. For example, the EEOC has issued guidance that sets forth its view that the use of criminal history in hiring decisions might have a disparate impact on candidates who are members of racial minority groups, particularly black and Latino men. 196 In the same vein, New York prohibits employers from discriminating against candidates with criminal convictions unless there is a direct relationship between the previous offense and the position or if hiring the applicant would create an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety of the general public. 197 Additionally, the use of credit checks in employment decisions has received increased scrutiny. Again, the EEOC has questioned whether the use of credit checks might have an adverse impact on female and minority candidates. 198 And the federal government and several states have limited how employers may use credit checks in hiring. 199 To the extent that the primary effect of the antiunemployment discrimination legislation might be to protect vulnerable members of constitutionally protected groups from discrimination, the theory of interest convergence might explain its rise. In general, with regard to employment discrimination, the interest convergence theory suggests that states protect minorities only when doing so also promotes the interests of the majority. 200 Recall that thirty-two percent of the total respondents in a national Gallup poll identified "unemployment/jobs" as the most important problem facing the country today. 201 And, while black, Hispanic, senior, and lowincome respondents are particularly concerned about unemployment, it is an issue that cuts across all segments. 202 
IV. Conclusion
Unemployment is a significant issue in contemporary America. But the rise of anti-unemployment discrimination legislation does not appear to address the scarcity of jobs and, thus, is unlikely to reduce unemployment in the aggregate. However, the legislation might have an overall positive effect by reducing arbitrary discrimination in hiring and long-term unemployment, which have negative impacts on the economy. Additionally, the legislation expresses a set of social values about fairness and hard work. And the legislation protects members of constitutionally-protected groups who likely are disproportionately impacted by current-employment requirements. In sum, an objective look at anti-unemployment discrimination reveals that it is a positive example of interest convergence that might not have all the benefits that its proponents claim but is not just a placebo and also has very little-if any-downside.
believe that their own self-interests are furthered."); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523-24 (1980) (arguing that the "interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites").
201. See Most Important Problem, supra note 9. 202. Saad, supra note 12.
